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Abstract
Contingent charges for nancial services, such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts,
are often controversial. We study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized
setting with naive and sophisticated consumers. We contrast situations where the
naive benet from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where
competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive, arguably
unfairly. The case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good
part, but not only, on the weight placed on distributional concerns. The economic
and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided
by the UK Supreme Court.
1 Introduction
In November 2009 the UK Supreme Court gave judgment on the following question of law:
can the fairness of bank charges levied on customers in respect of unauthorized overdrafts
be challenged as excessive? Unauthorized overdraft fees are an important example of
the widespread and often controversial practice of contingent charges charges that are
triggered only if particular contingencies arise and which often catch customers unawares,
either because they did not know of the fee and/or that the triggering event would happen.
Similar issues arise with respect to other kinds of contingent charge such as late payment
fees for credit cards, minibar charges in a hotel room, international roaming charges for
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mobile phones, and overagecharges when a subscriber makes more calls than are included
as free in her chosen mobile phone contract. Of course, most charges are contingent on
a consumer choice, but the key features of these examples are, rst, that the supplier
can usually take payment without further agreement from the consumer in particular, a
consumer could run up a large bill without being aware of doing so and, second, there is a
perception that many consumers choose supplier in these markets without taking adequate
account of the level of that suppliers contingent charges.
What economic ine¢ ciencies can unregulated contingent charges give rise to? When
do they cause distributional e¤ects that may be regarded as undesirable? Can regulation
improve matters? If so, what form should it take? Apart from a regime of caveat emptor,
where rms banks, say are more-or-less free to o¤er any contracts to their customers,
including those with high contingent charges, the main policy options are:
(a) require that banks make their terms for unauthorized overdrafts more prominent in
their marketing materials and contracts;
(b) require, where technically feasible, banks to warn consumers in advance when they
request a transaction which will incur a contingent charge;
(c) allow consumer to opt out of a banks automatic overdraft facility (or, as a policy
variant, require consumers to opt in to a banks automatic overdraft facility), and
(d) directly or indirectly place a cap on permitted contingent charges.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines relevant features of retail
banking in the UK, including evidence on the incidence of contingent charges and kinds
of consumer inattentiveness. Section 3 then discusses economic literature related to con-
tingent charges, in particular concerning high pricing in tied aftermarkets, and on markets
with consumer heterogeneity with respect to information and sophistication. On that issue,
a distinction is emphasized between situations where market outcomes for naive consumers
are linked to those for sophisticated ones, and situations where the two types get contrast-
ing deals. That distinction is central to section 4, the analytical core of the paper, where
a simple model also shows how, in some circumstances, unchecked contingent charges can
be detrimental to e¢ ciency and competition. Against that economic background, section
5 explains and assesses the Court judgment in the UK bank charges case.
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2 Retail banking in the UK
In 2008, the UKs O¢ ce of Fair Trading (OFT) published a market study of personal
current accounts, drawing on data from the year 2006.1 In the UK, the prevailing charging
model for current accounts is the so-called free if in creditmodel, whereby consumers
pay no xed charges or charges on standard transactions while their balance is in credit.
Consumers are paid little or no interest on their credit balances, which constitutes an
implicit payment to the banks who can re-invest their customersbalances at market rates.2
If a consumer borrows from their bank, however, they will need to pay charges. Di¤erent
contractual terms apply to loans and overdrafts which are arranged in advance and to
overdrafts which are unarranged. In broad terms, the market for arranged borrowing
appears to perform relatively well. A consumer who needs a substantial loan (e.g., for a
car or home improvement) will typically enter into a loan agreement of specied duration
and repayment terms. Consumers may shop around for such a loan (which need not be
supplied by their existing bank) and will usually be made aware of the principal contractual
terms when they sign the loan contract.3
By contrast, the marketfor unarranged borrowing, which is necessarily a service tied
to the consumers existing bank, appears more problematic. When a customer requests
a transaction which puts their balance below zero (or, more generally, below their agreed
overdraft limit), a bank may process this transaction and charge a relatively high interest
rate on the debt. The bank will also levy some form of insu¢ cient funds charge. In
2006, the average paid item charge, for instance, was around £ 23 per item, so that a
consumer on a shopping trip involving several transactions could, perhaps inadvertently,
run up substantial charges. Moreover, the average level of these insu¢ cient funds charges
had risen in the years before 2006.4 At that time no advance warning was typically given
1See OFT (2008), from where all the numbers in this section are taken. Part II of the Final Report
of the UKs Independent Commission on Banking (2011), which one of us (JV) chaired, has some more
recent competition analysis. In this paper, however, we conne attention to the OFT (2008) report in
view of the richness of its data on overdraft usage.
2Those rates have fallen since the nancial crisis of 2008.
3Nevertheless, there may also be concerns about contingent charges for these loan contracts, for instance
to do with fees for late payment. The 2001 First National Bank case, discussed briey in section 5, involved
this issue.
4If a bank decided not to process a requested transaction due to insu¢ cient funds, they levied a di¤erent
charge, an unpaid itemcharge, which in 2006 averaged about £ 30. Indeed, it is possible that a requested
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when a customer requested a transaction that would generate an insu¢ cient funds charge.
These insu¢ cient funds charges made a very substantial contribution to the total revenues
generated by current accounts, and in 2006 they accounted for more than 30% of current
account revenue.5
The incidence of these insu¢ cient funds charges is highly concentrated within the pop-
ulation of bank customers. More than three-quarters of current accounts incurred no
insu¢ cient funds charge in 2006. Of the 23% of current accounts which did incur at least
one such charge, about 40% incurred at least six. About one-third of those consumers
who incurred a charge paid more than £ 200 in insu¢ cient funds charges in the year, and
about 1.4 million consumers paid more than £ 500 in such charges in 2006.6 Thus, while
the typicalor averageconsumer did not encounter these charges, it is not true that
such charges were rare. Since it is plausible that those consumers who paid these charges
were on average less well o¤ than those who did not pay charges,7 this method of funding
current accounts  whereby nancially constrained consumers pay contingent fees which
help fund the free service o¤ered to those in credit  might appear to some as a kind of
reverse Robin Hood exercise.8
Consumer inattentiveness or naivety of various forms is probably quite widespread
in the consumer population. In 2006, only 5% of consumers said that insu¢ cient funds
charges were an important factor in their choice of bank.9 Two-thirds of consumers in
the survey said they did not know their banks charges for unarranged overdrafts.10 While
transaction might incur both charges: if the transaction was declined, the bank would levy an unpaid item
charge, which in turn allows the bank to levy a paid item charge on the rst charge. See OFT (2008, chart
3.16) and surrounding discussion for more details on the various charges associated with insu¢ cient funds.
5See chart 2.3. The banks obtained about 50% of their current account revenue from the interest they
obtain on their customerscredit balances. In most European countries, fee revenue from excess borrowing
was no more than 10% of current account revenue, although they generally do not operate the free if in
creditfunding model, but levy monthly xed fees and transaction fees (see box 3.17).
6See chart 4.9.
7There is some limited discussion of this point at paragraph 4.64.
8This phrase appeared, with a disclaimer, in the Supreme Court decision we discuss in section 5 (see
paragraph 2 of the judgment).
9See paragraph 4.76. Of course, this is also consistent with the possibility that consumers did care
about these charges, but found no signicant di¤erences between banks on this dimension. OFT (2008)
does not provide information about price dispersion across banks in the level of these charges.
10See paragraph 4.75. This is not necessarily surprising given that more than three-quarters of consumers
do not actually pay these charges.
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these charges were not hidden they could easily be found after a few clicks on a banks
website, for instance  neither were they prominent in the banksmarketing materials, in
contrast to other aspects of the total service (e.g., interest rates paid on balances, ATM
charges, or branch coverage). About a quarter of those who incurred an insu¢ cient funds
charge in 2006 claimed they did not know beforehand that these charges existed.11 More-
over, some consumers may have been aware of the existence of such charges, but did not
anticipate that they would have to pay them.12 Consistent with these observations, inter-
nal bank documents suggest that banks did not believe that increases in insu¢ cient funds
charges signicantly a¤ected demand for their accounts.13 It is relevant that perceived
switching costs are quite high in this market, and switching between banks is infrequent
in the UK. This means that a poor initial choice of bank  for instance, one with high
contingent charges may have long-run implications.14
Another form of inattentiveness relates to a consumers imperfect tracking of her bank
balance. (The di¢ culty is worse if more than one person uses the account.) When those
consumers who incurred an insu¢ cient funds charge in 2006 were asked why they had
most recently exceeded their agreed limit, only 24% agreed with the statements insuf-
cient funds/overspendor knew it would happen but had to make a payment, while
the remainder indicated some form of inadvertence (e.g., uncertainties about the timing
of transactions, did not check account, forgot about a payment). For many such
consumers, one imagines that an advance warning that a charge would be levied if they
proceed would induce the consumer to use another form of payment (or to abandon the
purchase altogether). Consistent with this observation, it appears that many consumers
would prefer to have a hard budget constraint, rather than being o¤ered an automatic over-
draft facility. For instance, more than half of consumers in the survey claimed they would
wish to agree up front with their bank that no debit card transactions that would lead
them into unarranged overdraft would be processed.15 Assuming this proportion reects
11See paragraph 4.74.
12See paragraph 4.69. It is plausible, though not quantied in the survey, that some consumers were
aware of these charges, but were over-optimistic about their level. For instance, in para. 4.100 one consumer
stated that I thought Id be charged maybe £ 15 or £ 20 in total, but they walloped me with something
like £ 70.
13See paragraph 3.74. For instance, one document stated that increasing [these] charges will have less
impact on our marketing position [than] credit interest changes due to its lower visibility.
14See chart 3.8, which shows that only 13% of consumers changed bank in the previous ve years.
15See paragraph 4.97.
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preferences in the consumer population, this raises the question why banks did not (in
2006) o¤er their consumers the ability to opt out of these automatic overdraft facilities.16
As we discuss in section 4, possible reasons for this include consumer over-optimism at the
time they choose their contract about the likelihood of going overdrawn, and the possibility
that banks obtain substantial prots from allowing naive consumers to go overdrawn.17
3 Literature related to contingent charges
Unarranged overdrafts are a classic instance of a tied aftermarket, in that a consumer
must obtain the overdraft service from her existing bank. Such markets, where customers
demand ongoing services complementary to an initial purchase, were discussed by Shapiro
(1995) in the context of the 1992 Kodak case decided by the US Supreme Court.18 As well
as bank accounts/overdrafts, familiar examples include printers/cartridges, razors/blades,
cars/servicing, and a variety of hardware/software combinations in the computer industry.
Aftermarket prices often appear to be high, and resistant to competitive challenge because
of customer lock-in. In the Kodak case the issue was whether Kodak should be assumed
not to have market power in aftermarkets for parts and servicing of its equipment when
16Paragraph 4.98 suggests that at the time no bank did o¤er this opt-out service. In 1999 government
encouraged banks to o¤er a so-called basic bank accounto¤ering only limited services, where overdrafts
were allowed only in restricted circumstances. However, there has been only limited take-up of this type of
account, and there have been allegations that banks were not e¤ectively marketing these accounts (which
presumably were often loss-making). See paragraphs 2.12, 2.45, 3.1053.110 and chart 2.1 for details.
17Stango and Zinman (2009, 2011) document with US data the proportion of bank customers who pay
overdraft fees, and how many of these fees could be avoided if customers paid greater attention to their
nances. Stango and Zinman (2009, Table 1) nd in their sample taken in 2006/7 that about two-thirds of
bank customers pay no overdraft fee, and that the 90th percentile of those who pay at least one overdraft
fee pays $43 dollars in such fees each month. The same table also shows that the median customer (among
those who pay at least one fee) could avoid 62% of their fees by using another payment method. Stango
and Zinman (2011) suggest that annual overdraft fees in the US are roughly £ 30-40 billion, which is
about $150 per account. The same paper documents survey data which indicate that many consumers are
inattentive about the state of their account balances. Thus, 60% of people who went overdrawn claimed
that they thought there was enough money in my account, while most of the remainder claimed the
money I deposited was not yet available. Overall, these papers paint a picture which is broadly similar
to the situation in the UK described here.
18Eastman Kodak Co. v Independent Technical Services Inc., et al, 504 US 451. In contrast to Kodak,
antitrust defendants have won almost all antitrust cases before the US Supreme Court in the twenty years
since.
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market power is absent from the equipment market. The Supreme Court said that such
an assumption could not be made.
Shapiro critically discusses a number of theories of aftermarket power. On the limited
commitment theory, the equipment seller cant or wont pre-commit aftermarket pricing,
with the result of ine¢ cient low-then-high pricing. On the costly information theory,
myopic or naive consumers buy the initial item before realizing that aftermarket prices
are high. On the price discrimination theory, the low-then-high pricing pattern is a way
for the supplier to charge more to high users than low users. Shapiro discusses why the
aggregate consumer harm which could be expected to result from these theories is relatively
small when the initial market is competitive, and how antitrust law would seem to be a
heavy-handed way to address the problem. For instance, when consumers are broadly
homogenous and aftermarket prices are high (either because of a lack of commitment or
because consumers do not pay attention to aftermarket prices when they make their initial
purchase), then rms will compete hard to supply the initial item, and aftermarket prots
are largely passed-back to consumers in the form of a subsidized base item.19 The result
of this loss-leader pricing is that the consumer harm is caused by an ine¢ cient pattern of
prices with consumer loss trianglesrather than the more sizable prot rectangles
normally associated with monopoly pricing. Similarly, if the aim of high aftermarket pricing
is to discriminate between high- and low-usage consumers, a policy which restricts such
discrimination (e.g., by bringing aftermarket prices down) may have some modest impact
on aggregate consumer welfare, but its primary e¤ect is to redistribute surplus from low
to high users.
These themes from the economic literature on aftermarkets  that market failure (if
any) is associated more with an ine¢ cient balance of prices rather than excessive prot
 are relevant to the context of bank overdraft fees. But this market has special features
which make it harder to be so sanguine about the laissez-faire outcome. First, the distri-
butional aspect of high contingent charges is more acute when it comes to bank balances
than, say to toner cartridges and printers. Those who make more frequent use of the
unarranged overdraft facility are likely to be on average less well o¤ than the rest, and so
have a higher marginal utility of income which could make redistribution to them welfare
19Ellison (2005) analyzes an oligopoly model in which consumers with strong brand preferences for the
base product are also more willing to buy the add-on product. In such a model, when rms hide the
add-on price they make strictly greater prots than when they publicise the add-on price.
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enhancing.20 A second feature, as discussed in section 2, is that many people appear to
consume the overdraft service inadvertently, whereas people do not accidently purchase a
toner cartridge.21 In sum, the aftermarkets literature does not address a central issue for
consumer (as distinct from antitrust) policy the perception that certain market practices
exploit vulnerableconsumers to the gain of others.
There is now a substantial body of literature that examines the nature of competition
in mixed markets where some consumers are sophisticatedwell-informed about the
availability, price and quality of the choices on o¤er and others, the naive, are not. This
work can often be tted into the following shorthand framework. Suppose the proportion
of sophisticated consumers in the population is  and that p represents an e¤ective price
ceiling, perhaps imposed by policy, for a service in the market. In principle, consumer
policy could a¤ect either , via disclosure or education polices, or p. In terms of these two
parameters, let PN(; p) and PS(; p) stand for the (expected) outlay by a naive and a
sophisticated consumer respectively, while T (; p)  PS(; p) + (1  )PN(; p) measures
the total outlay from consumers. In reasonable settings, sophisticated consumers obtain
better deals than naive consumers, so that PN > PS.
In some situations, naive consumers obtain a deal which is linked to that obtained by
sophisticated consumers, and the greater pressure on prices induced by either the presence
of greater numbers of sophisticated consumers or by a tightening of p is shared by naive
ones. That is, PS and PN each decrease with  and increase with p. In particular, an addi-
tional sophisticated consumer exerts a positive externality on all consumers. To illustrate
20By contrast, those who make greater use of, say, toner cartridges are likely, all else equal, to be
better o¤ than less frequent uses. Thus an outcome with high toner prices may reasonably be viewed as
distributionally fair. Moreover, given the xed printer cost, the e¤ective per-page price paid by high
users is lower than that paid by low users.
21Grubb (2011) presents a model in which rms levy a charge if a consumers consumption goes beyond
a specied level. (Applications include mobile phone tari¤s where consumers get a specied number of
calls including in their package, but pay charges for calls beyond this level, or  more relevant for our
focus  banks who charge a fee if a customers balance falls below a specied threshold.) He supposes
that consumers might inadvertently cross the threshold and pay the penalty. He considers the impact of
a policy which requires rms to warn their customers if they are about to incur a penalty charge, as in
policy (b) from the above list. If consumers are homogeneous but under-estimate their likely consumption
of the service, unregulated rms have an incentive to set high penalty charges, which could leave some
consumers with negative surplus. In such cases, the policy intervention helps consumers, although the
impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
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this situation, consider Varians (1980) model where an exogenous fraction of consumers
know all prices and buy from the cheapest supplier, while other consumers buy from a ran-
dom supplier. Here, a policy which boosts the fraction of informed consumers will induce
rms to price more competitively and this helps both kinds of consumer, so that PS and
PN decrease with . If p represents the maximum price which any rm is permitted to
charge in Varians model, then for given  a reduction in p will make rms choose lower
prices on average, which again benets both groups.22 In these kinds of case, a policy in-
tervention which boosts  or tightens p is uncontroversial (at least from a consumer welfare
standpoint), since di¤erent kinds of consumer have congruent interests.
In other situations, naive and sophisticated consumers end up with contrasting deals 
for example with high contingent charges being paid more often by naive consumers and
the possibility opens up that sophisticated consumers gain at the expense of naive ones.
This case has more relevance for the UK bank market, where only a minority of consumers
pay contingent fees, and these fees help fund the free if in creditmodel enjoyed by other
consumers. If prots from naive consumers fund other services, then it is possible that
both PS and PN increase with , so that an additional sophisticated consumer exerts a
negative externality on both groups of consumer. It may also be that aggregate consumer
outlay T increases in . In addition, if a tightening of p reduces the scope for this kind of
cross-subsidy, the two groups could well have opposing preferences towards such a policy,
with naive consumers benetting from lower p and sophisticated consumers being harmed,
and this conict renders policy more contentious. We discuss this scenario in more detail
in section 4.
Perhaps the leading model which illustrates this second situation is by Gabaix and
Laibson (2006), who present a model where consumers buy a core product (the bank
account in our framework) and possibly an add-onproduct (the unarranged overdraft). If
she thinks about it in advance, any consumer can (at some cost, which is socially ine¢ cient)
substitute away from the add-on product. Firms decide whether to announce or to shroud
22However, it may be that  and p are negatively related rather than independent parameters. Thus,
as discussed further in section 4.2 below, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) consider a setting where
consumers can choose to become better informed by incurring a cost. In this case, the incentive to become
informed depends on p, and so the proportion (p) of consumers who choose to become better informed
is an increasing function of p. Tighter p reduces price dispersion, so there is less incentive to become
informed. The net result can easily be that all consumers are worse o¤ when p is tightened.
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their add-on price (or contingent charge). If rms reveal their add-on price, all consumers
will substitute away from the add-on unless the add-on price is low enough. However, if
rms shroud their add-on price, consumers di¤er in their behavior: sophisticated consumers
are aware of the add-on service and will substitute away in advance if they anticipate that
there is a high add-on price, while naive consumers simply do not think about the add-
on service and take no steps to avoid high add-on prices. Gabaix and Laibson show
that it is one equilibrium for all rms to shroud add-on prices whenever the fraction of
sophisticated consumers, , is su¢ ciently low. In such cases, the sophisticated consumers
correctly anticipate high add-on prices, and so (ine¢ ciently) substitute away from the add-
on service. In this equilibrium, the sophisticated consumers benet from the presence of
the naive consumers, as anticipated add-on prots from the latter cause the base price
(which is all that the sophisticated consumers pay) to be reduced.
4 Economic analysis
Traditional models of consumer behavior cannot easily explain the high overdraft fees seen
in the UK and elsewhere. If all consumers paid attention to contingent charges and could
accurately forecast, and perhaps a¤ect, their likelihood of going overdrawn, then standard
insurance arguments suggest that banks would set the contingent charge at a relatively
low level.23 In this section, we outline a model of consumer behavior which seems more
consistent with observed market practice.
4.1 A stylized market for bank accounts
We present a simple model of bank accounts which illustrates several of the most policy-
relevant aspects of the market. The model is a modied version of Gabaix and Laibsons
(2006) framework, which was discussed in section 3, adjusted so that there is no shrouding
decision to be made by rms. In order to focus on the consumer protection problems which
could arise even in the absence of market power, we (like Gabaix and Laibson) work with
23One traditional reason why banks might set p > c is to cover their xed costs. In many cases, the
most e¢ cient way for a multiproduct rm to cover xed costs is to impose a (Ramsey) mark-up on each
of its products, including their unarranged overdraft service.
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a model involving perfect competition.24 Specically, a number of identical banks compete
to o¤er two tied services: a bank account, the price of which is denoted P and the cost of
which is C, and, if needed, an unarranged overdraft facility with contingent charge p and
associated cost c. Suppose that existing law or cultural norms put an exogenous ceiling
p > c on the contingent charge. Like Gabaix and Laibson, we suppose that consumers
are able ex ante to a¤ect their probability of going overdrawn: if a consumer is diligent
in controlling her nances, she will never go overdrawn, but if she is not diligent she will
inadvertently become overdrawn  times on average.25 Suppose that being diligent involves
ex ante e¤ort cost e, where
c < e < p ; (1)
so that it is more e¢ cient for consumers sometimes to go overdrawn (incurring cost c each
time) than to be diligent, but any (sophisticated) consumer chooses to be diligent when
faced with the highest overdraft charge p.
An exogenous fraction  of consumers are sophisticated in the following sense: they are
aware of the possibility of inadvertent overdraft unless they are diligent, and they costlessly
examine the marketing materials for the associated contingent charge. Such consumers will
be diligent if e  p, and they choose the bank with the lowest value of P + minfe; pg.
The remaining 1    consumers are naive, in the sense that they do not consider ex ante
the danger of inadvertently going overdrawn or of paying a high contingent charge. In
particular, they do not take the trouble to investigate p and nor are they ever diligent.
Naive consumers simply choose the bank with the lowest base price P .
Perhaps the most natural justication for a naive consumers inattentiveness is that she
is over-optimistic in some way. For instance, consistent with survey responses mentioned
in section 2, she may be over-optimistic about her ability to avoid getting overdrawn. If
she does not anticipate going overdrawn, she pays no attention to a banks contingent
24This is not to suggest that there are not competition problems in the UK banking sector. As well
as discussing the special features of contingent charges, OFT (2008) describes market performance in the
sector more generally. See also ICB (2011).
25A consumer might, for instance, avoid going overdrawn by going to the trouble of setting up a sweep
account, which automatically shifts money from a savings account to the current account when the latters
funds are low. Alternatively, she might reduce the chance of inadvertent overdraft by maintaining a large
average account balance. If consumers defend themselves against a high contingent charge in this manner,
this boosts the prots of banks when they invest these large balances at market rates. This could give
banks an additional incentive to choose a high p, beyond those discussed in this model.
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charge p, no matter how conspicuous this fee is.26 Alternatively, the consumer may be
over-optimistic about the true level of the contingent charge p. For instance, she may
mistakenly believe that regulations or moral norms already enforce a cost-reective p, and
that it is not worth going to the e¤ort of reading the details of a banks contract. Such a
consumer would therefore choose not to be diligent.
Turning to bankspricing incentives, note rst that a bank will choose its contingent
charge to be either p = p or p = e=.27 Given (1), the latter is the e¢ cient outcome since
consumers need not incur the cost of diligence. The form of the equilibrium depends on
the fraction of sophisticated consumers  and the level of the price limit p. Consider rst
the possibility that all banks choose e¢ cient contract terms, so that p = e=. In such an
equilibrium, competition ensures that banks just break even, so the tari¤ takes the form
p =
e

; P = C   [e  c] : (2)
Suppose one bank deviates and sets p = p. This does not a¤ect the attraction of its o¤er
to either type of consumer. (The naive do not choose their bank on the basis of p, while a
sophisticated consumers expected outlay is P+e in any case.) This banks expected prots
from the contingent charge per consumer are now (1 )(p c) (since now only the naive
pay the charge), while before each consumer generated e  c in expected prot from the
contingent charge. Thus, this deviation is unprotable provided (1  )(p  c) < e  c,
or
 >
p  e
(p  c) : (3)
Thus, if the fraction of sophisticated consumers is large enough, or the maximum contingent
charge p is low enough, then banks choose e¢ cient contract terms.28 In this equilibrium,
26There is now a rich literature which documents consumer over-optimism and constructs models where
rms respond to this consumer bias. See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) for theory and evidence
related to over-optimism about the frequency of gym visits, and Sandroni and Squintani (2007) for a
model of insurance when agents are over-optimistic about their accident probability. See Spiegler (2011)
for detailed discussion of this literature.
27If a bank chooses to set p > e= then sophisticated consumers will be diligent and will not pay the
contingent charge; therefore, the rm might as well set the highest possible p as that has no impact on
its demand from the naive consumers. Likewise, if a bank sets p < e= then it could raise p a little and
reduce P a little so that P + p remains constant. This tari¤ modication does not a¤ect its demand or
prot from the sophisticated consumers, but may boost demand from the naive consumers (while keeping
prot from each one unchanged) as these consumers care only about P .
28This result corroborates an old intuition that if there are enough informed consumers rms have an
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both kinds of consumer have the same expected outlay, which is the expected cost of
providing the service:
PN = PS = C + c : (4)
The base price in (2) is subsidized, to reect the (modest) prots generated by the contin-
gent charge.
Next, consider a possible equilibrium in which all banks choose ine¢ cient contracts, so
that p = p. In such an equilibrium, competition ensures that banks just break even, so the
tari¤ takes the form
p = p ; P = C   (1  )(p  c) : (5)
(Here, the base price is subsidized by the factor (1 )(p c), which is the expected prot
from the contingent charge given that only the 1    naive consumers pay it.) Suppose
one bank deviates, and sets p = e=. If this bank keeps its base price P unchanged it will
attract the same consumers, but now all its consumers will pay the (reduced) contingent
charge. This deviation is not protable if condition (3) is violated. Thus, when enough
consumers are naive or the maximum fee p is high enough in the sense that condition (3)
fails, the equilibrium involves banks choosing ine¢ ciently high contingent charges. Note
that, regardless of which regime applies, only a single contract is observed in the market,
even though consumers are heterogeneous.29
Using the notation introduced in section 3, in this ine¢ cient equilibrium expected
outlays are
PN(; p) = C   (1  )(p  c) + p > C + c ;
PS(; p) = C   (1  )(p  c) + e < C + c ; (6)
T (; p) = C + (1  )c+ e :
Thus, compared to their expected outlay (4) in the e¢ cient equilibrium, naive consumers
are worse o¤ and the sophisticated are better o¤.
Recall that in section 3 we discussed two kinds of market: one where the deals obtained
by sophisticated and naive consumers were linked, and another where the respective deals
incentive to o¤er e¢ cient contracts, even though some consumers do not read the small print. See Schwartz
and Wilde (1983) for an inuential exposition of this view.
29One can check that, unless (3) holds with equality, there are no asymmetric equilibria where some
banks o¤er e¢ cient contract terms aimed at the sophisticated, while other banks exploit the naive in the
small print.
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are contrasting. The model presented here illustrates both possibilities. Within the para-
meter region where the ine¢ cient equilibrium applies, both kinds of consumer are harmed
when the proportion  of sophisticated consumers rises. Indeed, since a greater fraction of
consumers take the ine¢ cient action of being diligent, total welfare falls and total consumer
outlay T rises with  in this region. However, if  is increased enough that the equilibrium
changes to the e¢ cient one (i.e., (3) is satised), then total outlay from consumers drops
again. In this setting, welfare is maximized when no consumers are diligent, which occurs
either when  = 0 or when  is large enough that (3) holds. The fraction  might be
increased by disclosure or consumer education policies (policy (a) in the introduction). For
instance, if many consumers are over-optimistic about the level of overdraft fees, and for
that reason they are not diligent, then a publicity campaign to disclose high fees levels may
boost the proportion of sophisticated consumers. (An indirect e¤ect of the UK bank case,
discussed in the next section, may have been to make consumers more aware of the level
of charges.) However, in this model at least, such a policy is only benecial if it increases
 so much that the market shifts to the e¢ cient outcome.30
Turning to the impact of tightening p (policy (d) in the terminology in the introduction),
in the region where the ine¢ cient equilibrium occurs one can see from (6) that the two
kinds of consumer obtain contrasting deals. Sophisticated consumers like a high p since
they do not pay it, and the greater prots from the naive consumers subsidize the base
price. The naive are harmed by a high p, since they do pay it and get only a fraction of this
charge back as subsidy of the base price. Total outlay T does not depend on p, reecting
the zero-sum nature of surplus enjoyed by the two groups of consumer. However, if p is
tightened su¢ ciently that the regime moves from the ine¢ cient to the e¢ cient equilibrium,
then aggregate consumer welfare (but not a sophisticated consumers welfare) and overall
welfare rise. Any policy which acts to reduce the contingent fees charged by banks has
opposite e¤ects on the di¤erent consumer groups, and so may be contentious.
30Kosfeld and Schüwer (2011) analyze an extension of Gabaix and Laibsons model in which a seller can
partly distinguish naive from sophisticated consumers. In their model, as in the results described here,
they nd that an education policy which boosts  can be bad for welfare unless the shift is enough to move
to the e¢ cient equilibrium in which rms do not shroud their prices.
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4.2 Extensions
In this section we outline some extensions of the model just presented, and discuss the
impact of the remaining policy options listed in the introduction.
Negative prices not feasible: In the model presented, the subsidy on the base price may
be large enough that P in (2) or (5) is negative. This is most likely to happen when the
fraction of sophisticated consumers, , is small. If negative prices are not feasible, the
outcome will then be that P = 0, which is consistent with the UKs free if in credit
funding model for bank accounts. If P = 0, then ine¢ cient contracts with p = p will be
o¤ered whenever condition (3) is violated. Importantly, there will then be strictly positive
industry prots, equal to (1  )(p  c)  C. The non-negativity constraint on the base
price means that rms have no way to compete away the prots from the contingent charge
by subsidizing the base price. Moreover, there is no motive to reduce the contingent charge
below p, since sophisticated consumers do not pay this charge, and naive consumers do
not take account of it. Thus, the presence of naive consumers acts to soften competition
in this market.31 In this situation banks will care about the level of p and would resist
proposed regulation which tightens this cap.
Overdraft warnings: A natural policy (policy (b) in the introduction) is to require banks
to warn consumers when they request a transaction which would lead them into overdraft.
Thus, a consumer requesting £ 100 from an ATM from their debit card, when they have
only £ 90 in their account, could see a message on screen warning that such a transaction
would incur the specied charge. Suppose that if a consumer is warned that she is about
to incur the contingent charge, she can with cost b avoid the charge by using an alternative
means of payment (or by ceasing the transaction altogether). As with assumption (1) for
the diligence cost, suppose that
c < b < p ; (7)
so it is more e¢ cient to go into overdraft than to nd another means of payment, but a
consumer would prefer to nd another means of payment than pay the maximum contingent
charge. Clearly, a bank will set its contingent fee no higher than b in this regime. Since we
31Similarly, in Ellisons (2005) model with imperfect competition between sellers, prots are strictly
higher when rms conceal their contingent charges.
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assume b > c, banks prefer to induce consumers to go into overdraft than to decide against
the transaction, as is e¢ cient. Thus, if p is high enough that the ine¢ cient equilibrium
applies, the policy is akin to tightening p. As discussed in section 4.1, such a tightening
helps the naive consumers but harms the sophisticated. But if b is small enough that the
regime changes to the e¢ cient equilibrium, then aggregate consumer welfare, and total
welfare, rise when warnings of this kind are required.
One problem with this policy, however, is that warnings may only be feasible for certain
transactions, such as those involving ATMs or debit cards, and may not operate when a
consumers writes a cheque or authorizes a standing order with insu¢ cient funds. In these
cases, even with such a policy in place, some consumers remain vulnerable to high overdraft
charges.
Hard budget constraint : An alternative policy is to require banks to give consumers the
option of an account with a hard budget constraint (policy (c) in the introduction).32 If
a consumer chooses such an account, when she requests a transaction for which she has
insu¢ cient funds her transaction is declined. For now, suppose that a unpaid itemfee
is not levied when a transaction is declined. When a transaction is declined by the bank,
the consumer must nd an alternative means of payment (or cease the transaction) and
she then incurs the same cost b as above.33 Assumption (7) implies that using an account
with a hard budget constraint is ine¢ cient relative to the automatic overdraft service.
Allowing consumers to opt out of the automatic overdraft facility would have no impact
on the naive consumers if they did not consider the possibility of needing an overdraft in any
case. The opt-out policy may have some modest impact on the sophisticated consumers,
depending on whether they view it as more costly to be diligent ex ante or to incur the
cost b each time they go overdrawn, i.e., whether or not e < b. Regardless of which case
applies, it is clear that the opt-out policy cannot shift the regime from the ine¢ cient to
32In the United States since 2010 policy towards overdraft charges caused by debit card
and ATM payments is the opt-in variant of policy (c). See the Federal Reserves con-
sumer document New overdraft rules for debit and ATM cards, available to download at
www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_overdraft.htm.
33The assumption that the cost of having a transaction declined is no greater than the cost of choosing
an alternative after an advance warning implies, for instance, that there is no embarrassment involved
in having a transaction declined.
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the e¢ cient equilibrium, and nor can it protect the naive consumers.34
By contrast, an opt-in regime may have more signicant e¤ects. If the naive consumers
are automatically enrolled on a bank account with a hard budget constraint, it is not clear
why they would choose actively to move to the soft budget constraint. If the naive con-
sumers do not opt in to the automatic overdraft facility, the result may be that only the
sophisticated consumers ever pay the contingent charge, in which case banks would set p
just low enough that these consumers are willing to pay it. Assuming that before the inter-
vention the ine¢ cient regime applied, the impact of the policy is mixed: naive consumers
previously behaved e¢ ciently (neither being diligent, nor incurring the declined-transaction
cost b > c) but now they incur the cost b when they reach their budget constraint, while
the sophisticated previously were ine¢ ciently diligent but now behave e¢ ciently. Then
the net impact of the policy will depend on the detailed parameter conguration in the
market.
As well as the potential ine¢ ciency of a hard budget constraint versus an automatic
overdraft, this policy has another signicant drawback, which is that banks may continue
to levy contingent fees in the form of unpaid (rather than paid) item charges. (Recall
from section 2 that in the UK, unpaid item fees were also at a high level.) Even if policy
prevents banks levying such charges for ATM or debit card transactions, it is harder to so
in the case of cheques, standing orders and so on. Simply allowing consumers to choose a
hard budget constraint does not necessarily help vulnerable consumers, absent a parallel
policy to control unpaid item fees.
Rational but uninformed consumers: One can modify the model in section 4.1 so that the
potentially uninformed consumers are rational rather than naive. Specically, suppose that
a fraction 1    of consumers incur a reading cost when they observe a banks choice of
contingent charge. (Suppose that the remaining  consumers can see both prices for free,
as before.) If a consumer chooses not to investigate a banks choice of contingent charge,
suppose she holds equilibrium beliefs about the level of this charge. Unlike the naive
consumers earlier in this section, these uninformed consumers will therefore be diligent if
they anticipate a high contingent charge. Even if this reading cost is small, these 1   
34However, it is possible that after they have incurred an unexpected overdraft fee (and before they have
forgotten about the painful experience) a naive consumer may consider switching to an account without
an automatic overdraft facility.
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consumers will not choose to read the small print if they anticipate that rms do not
di¤er signicantly in their choices for p.
In this modied framework, it remains an equilibrium for rms to o¤er e¢ cient contract
terms whenever condition (3) applies: the 1  costly readers correctly anticipate e¢ cient
terms and so they neither read the small print nor are they diligent. If the fraction of costly
readers is higher than this, the outcome is more complicated.35 However, the outcome is
easy to understand in the limit case where  = 0, where all consumers incur reading costs.
Here, the equilibrium outcome is that no consumer discovers a banks contingent charge,
all banks charge the maximum fee p = p, and all consumers are diligent. This outcome is
essentially Diamonds (1971) famous paradox, but applied to the contingent charge instead
of the base price: if no consumers read the small print, a rm cannot attract custom by
o¤ering e¢ cient contracts, and if all rms o¤er the same monopoly terms in the small
print, it is not worth any consumer spending e¤ort to discover this. In such a situation,
welfare is increased in this model if policy acts to reduce p to a level at which consumers
have no need to be diligent.36
However, as discussed in Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), if consumers ratio-
nally choose whether or not to become informed of contractual terms then policy which
constrains charges may discourage consumers from investigating contracts in detail. If
consumers are partly protected by policy from exploitative terms in the small print, they
have less incentive to take care, and fewer consumers may choose to become fully informed.
When the fraction of informed consumers, (p), increases with the maximum contingent
charge p, rms have greater scope to set disadvantageous terms, and consumers could even
be made worse o¤ when p is tightened.
35A complicating factor when the uninformed consumers are Bayesian rather than naive is that they
will try to infer the content of small print terms from a rms base price. The same issue arises with
unobserved product quality, for instance when a sophisticated but ill-informed buyer of wine attempts to
estimate the wines likely quality from its price. See Cooper and Ross (1984) for a model in which some
consumers observe both quality and price, while others only observe price but hold rational beliefs about
quality given price. They nd that a greater proportion of fully-informed consumers implies that the less
informed are o¤ered a poor quality product less often.
36See Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell (2007, section 2.3.4) for further discussion of the impact of contract
reading costs and the (mostly legal) literature which addresses this issue.
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5 The UK bank charges case
The central question in the UK bank charges case37 was whether or not the contract terms
relating to unauthorized overdraft charges were excluded from regulatory assessment under
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.38 (These regulations transpose
into UK law a European Directive, so the case is of European, not just UK, signicance.)
Regulation 5(1) states that A contractual term which has not been individually negoti-
ated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a
signicant imbalance in the partiesrights and obligations arising under the contract, to
the detriment of the consumer. The bank charges case hinged on the interpretation and
application to the facts of the provision in Regulation 6(2), which excluded certain terms
from this fairness constraint:
In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a
term shall not relate
(a) to the denition of the main subject matter of the contract, or
(b) to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the services or
goods supplied in exchange.
The interpretation of this Regulation had been at issue in the First National Bank
case39 that came to the Law Lords some years earlier.40 That case, brought by the OFT,
concerned a term in a mortgage contract about the rate of interest payable on unpaid debt.
The Lords ruled that the term was not excluded from fairness assessment. The view was
held that it would frustrate the purpose of the regulation to interpret the exclusion broadly,
and Lord Steyn observed that [a]fter all, in a broad sense all terms of the contract are in
37O¢ ce of Fair Trading v Abbey National Plc and Others [2009] UKSC 6. The account here draws on
Whittakers (2011) legal analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court as well as the judicial opinions
therein. An insightful discussion of the economics relating to the case, and to contingent charges more
generally, is provided by Bennett (2012).
38In terms of the taxonomy in the Introduction, the answer to this question determines whether policy
option (d), price capping, is available.
39Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] UKHL 52. Regulation 6(2) was slightly
di¤erently worded at the time.
40In 2009 the judicial function of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords the Law Lords 
were taken on by the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. One of its rst cases was the bank
charges case.
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some way related to price or remuneration. It was emphasized that the term concerned
the consequences of default. However, having decided that the term at issue in that case
was capable of being assessed for fairness, the Law Lords overturned the judgment of the
Court of Appeal that the term was in fact unfair within the meaning of the Regulation.
Subsequent to the First National Bank case, the OFT launched an investigation into
the fairness of standard terms in credit card contracts imposing charges for defaults, in-
cluding fees for late payment and exceeding credit limits.41 As to the law, the OFT (2006)
concluded that default charge provisions are open to challenge on grounds of unfairness
if they have the object of raising more in revenue than is reasonably expected to be nec-
essary to recover certain limited administrative costs incurred by the credit card issuer.
This view accords with the common law principle that penalties for breach of contract
are legally unenforceable, while a clause which genuinely seeks to pre-estimate the other
partys loss caused by breach so-called liquidated damagesis enforceable. In a sense
this is the common laws own test of fairness for contract terms that provide for sums of
money payable on breach. On the facts, the OFT found that credit card default fees were
generally much higher than the fairlevel that reected cost recovery (in the sense of a
genuine pre-estimate of loss). The OFT said further that it would not take action against
fees below a £ 12 threshold, but that it would have a rebuttable presumption that higher
fees were unfair. Faced with this regulatory position, the card issuers reduced the charges,
most by almost a half, rather than challenge the OFT in court. The OFT immediately,
and publicly, turned its attention to bank current account charges. The stage was now set
for the bank charges case.
In July 2007 the OFT sought a court declaration that the Regulation 6(2) exclusion did
not apply to bank charges levied on personal current account customers for unauthorized
overdrafts i.e., so that their fairness could be assessed under the Regulations. A large
number of cases brought by individual consumers were suspended pending the outcome of
the OFT proceedings. The OFT won in the Commercial Court and also prevailed in the
Court of Appeal before the matter came to the Supreme Court.
A preliminary question was the interpretation of the services ... supplied in exchange.
If that had been taken narrowly to mean the contingent service of providing an unautho-
rized overdraft, then its price would immediately have been excluded from unfairness as-
41One of us (JV) was chairman of the OFT when this investigation began.
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sessment. But the Court adopted the broader view that the servicesrefers to the overall
package of current account services i.e., to the contract as a whole and not to individual
aspects of it. That being so, were unauthorized overdraft charges part of the price and
remunerationfor the package?
Below the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal had said not. For the typical or average
consumer, it held, unauthorized overdrafts are not part of the essential current account
package  the main subject matter of the contract. The Court of Appeal took the
view that unauthorized overdraft charges are not typically in mind when consumers choose
current account providers.42 Consumers mostly incur such charges not through choice,
still less in exchange, but rather through inadvertence.43 Though not expressed as such,
they are on this view like default charges for breach of contract (which the Law Lords in
First National Bank had held to be subject to fairness assessment). Consumers choosing
to go overdrawn generally arrange overdraft facilities in advance rather than triggering
expensive charges for unauthorized overdraft use. In sum, on this view, the liability to pay
the contingent charges is not part of the core or essential bargain, and they are therefore
not beyond the scope of regulatory assessment of fairness.
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously ruled that the charges are part of the price
or remuneration for the package of services. The Court disagreed that the charges were
akin to default charges. Rather, they are contingent payments due in exchangefor the
package of services. They are made in widespread, not aberrant, circumstances. Prominent
in the Courts reasoning was the importance of the charges as a revenue stream for the
banks.44 This has attracted criticism. Whittaker (2011) argues that some of the judicial
statements come very close to saying that the fact that the banks make a good deal of
money out of the charges generated by the relevant terms means that they provide for
part of the price or remuneration for the package of services. It is indeed paradoxical
42See section 2 above for evidence on this point.
43It may be countered that even inadvertent consumers ought to learn from experience. But whatever
the degree of competition for new accounts, switching current account providers is perceived by consumers
as di¢ cult. In any case, as a matter of law, the assessment of fairness should be by reference to the point
of contracting.
44Thus, for example, Lord Phillips, President of the Court, at paragraph 88: the Banks now rely on
the Relevant Charges as an important part of the revenue that they generate from the current account
services. If they did not receive the Relevant Charges they would not be able protably to provide current
account services to their customers in credit without making a charge to augment the value of the use of
their funds.
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that, assuming the elasticity of demand to be less than one, higher charges mean greater
revenue, and hence, on this argument, count against assessment for potential unfairness.
Whittaker also criticises the apparent adoption by some of the judges of the viewpoint of
the suppliers, the banks, for the assessment of fairness, rather than that of the typical or
average consumer.
Does the importance of the charges for bank revenues yield an inference that consumers
must be well aware of the charges, and hence that no question as to their fairness arises?
Not necessarily, because although a¤ected consumers may become all too aware ex post of
the level of charges, there is clear evidence (see section 2) of widespread lack of awareness ex
ante hence the controversy over them. Why then dont consumers who tend to be liable
for the charges change bank? Doubtless some do, but the actual, or at any rate perceived,
costs of switching relative to the benets appear signicant and may be a deterrent. There
might also be biased expectations regarding recurrence of charges. Anyway, substantial
charges can mount before customers realise. For this and other reasons, high contingent
charges might become an equilibrium feature of the market, as in the analysis in section
4, in which case liable customers lack attractive options to switch to.45
In giving his judgment Lord Mance46 saw no basis for a requirement to identify a typical
consumer or to conne the scope of consideration to contract terms that s/he is likely to
have focused upon. Regard should be had to the view which the hypothetical reasonable
person would take of the nature and terms of the contract. From that perspective, the
contingent charges in this case were part of the price or remuneration for the overall package
of banking services. That being so, reasoned Lord Mance47, the level of those charges could
not be challenged under the regulations. The fairness of the pricing of part of the package
could only be judged in relation to the pricing of the package as a whole, but that was
clearly precluded by Regulation 6(2).
45In concurring with her judicial colleagues, Lady Hale added a paragraph (paragraph 93) on the di¢ culty
of nding a public policy solution to the problem at hand. [I]s the real problem, she wrote, that we
do not have a real choice because the suppliers all o¤er much the same product and do not compete on
some of their terms? This is the situation here. But it is not clear to me whether the proper solution is
to nd some way of forcing the suppliers to compete with one another in the terms they o¤er or whether
the solution is to condemn one particular model of charging for those services. Fortunately, however, that
is for Parliament and not for this Court.
46At paragraph 113.
47At paragraph 99.
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The Supreme Court judgment was the end of the matter in law but not in practice. In
March 2010 the OFT announced signicant improvements in unarranged overdraftsfol-
lowing discussions with the banks.48 In addition to substantial paid item charge reductions
since the case began in 2007, these have included improved transparency of charges and
real-time account information and greater ability for consumers to opt out of unarranged
overdraft facilities. However, now that the regulatory cloud has lifted from the banks, it
is possible that the frequency with which overdraft charges are levied has increased. It
remains to be seen what will be the overall e¤ect on bank revenues from such charges.
The wider implication of the Supreme Court ruling appears to be that it is unclear what
scope, if any, exists for challenge under the regulations of pricing terms other than default
charges and charges closely akin to default charges. While, from an economic perspective,
there is good reason for caution about regulating pricing structures in competitive con-
ditions, this is not a very satisfactory position. Arguably it places undue weight on the
price/non-price distinction, and among price terms the distinction drawn between default
(and default-like) charges and others is one with a questionable economic rationale.
6 Concluding comment
Stepping back from the bank charges case that motivated the discussion in this paper,
we conclude with a general comment about markets in which sophisticatedand naive
consumers coexist. In reality, of course, consumer sophistication is a matter of degree rather
than a binary matter. As the discussion above has illustrated, the distinction between those
two types can take di¤erent forms. For example, it may be that the naive are irrational in
some sense, or it could just be that they lack information available to the sophisticated,
perhaps because they lack incentive to get it.
Be that as it may, the analysis above has illuminated a sharp di¤erence between (i)
markets where outcomes for the naive are linked to those of the sophisticated, and (ii)
markets where the two types have contrasting outcomes. In the rst case the naive are
protected by the sophisticated, and the market works better for all consumers when there
are more sophisticated consumers. The case for consumer protection regulation of contin-
gent charges is not so strong, and it could even be counter-productive by diminishing the
48Press release available at www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/26-10.
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incentive to become sophisticated.
On the other hand, in markets with contrasting outcomes, there is redistribution (rel-
ative to natural benchmarks) from naive to sophisticated consumers. The latter benet
from the presence of the naive because competition between rms causes some prot from
the naive to be channelled to them, which in turn harms the naive. Whether, and to what
extent, one regards such redistribution as bad depends on the respective welfare weights
of the two consumer types in the market in question, but in many settings (which plau-
sibly include bank accounts) it may be reasonable to accord a higher welfare weight to
naive consumers. Market e¢ ciency can also su¤er in markets with contrasting outcomes
as the sophisticated take socially ine¢ cient actions to avoid the high contingent charges
paid by the naive. The market can work worse for both consumer types when there are
more sophisticated consumers. Depending on the importance placed on distributional con-
cerns, a stronger case for consumer protection regulation of contingent charges though
not necessarily by price control is then apparent.
A general issue for policy design towards markets with contrasting outcomes is the
need for more analysis of distributional issues in retail markets, from which the industrial
organization literature has normally steered clear.
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